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Park Bae Gyoon**
There have been some critical debates about the construction-oriented, developmentalist 
nature of the Korean state among the Korean scholars. However, no clear explanation has 
emerged for why the Korean state adopted such construction-oriented, developmentalist 
selectivity. This paper seeks to answer this question of why the construction-oriented state 
has developed in South Korea by employing the strategic-relational approach to the state. In 
this paper, the author argues that the construction-oriented, developmentalist nature of the 
Korean state has been strengthened because at the local and regional scales, highly politicized 
territorial interests have been mobilized as a result of complex interactions among spatial 
selectivity of the Korean state, uneven regional development and territorialized party politics 
from the 1960s to the present. More specifically, the author emphasizes that the following 
conditions were the most influential in the formation and intensification of construction-
oriented state building: 1) As the central cleavage structure of party politics is based on 
locality, parties and politicians easily accept local developmental politics, and thereby 
influence governmental decision-making according to regional interests; 2) Due to the weak 
development of class politics (at the national scale) and immature grass-root democracy (at 
the local scale), place-based interests and identities tend to be strongly territorialized; 3) 
Continuing from the 1970s and influenced by the politics of regionalism, the ways in which 
the Koreans interpret the political and economic realities has been constructed on the basis 
of the discursive frame of the highly politicized “center-local” relations, which has led to 
the intensified inter-local/inter-regional competition for the central government’s spending 
on local/regioinal development projects. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the 
situation of South Korea’s neo-developmentalism and construction-oriented tendency needs 
to be understood through the mechanisms of more complex political, social, and economic 
conflicts and interaction effects among social forces acting in and through the state, and that 
the question cannot be explained simply by the ‘irrationality, incapacity, and immorality’ of 
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the government and its officials.
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I. INTRoDUcTIoN
Among the various criticisms of the Lee Myung Bak government’s 
administrative leadership, one of the main points is that policies are 
extremely focused on land development and construction projects. 
Especially, it is constantly pointed out that the national government’s main 
policies—such as the pursuit of the Korean Peninsula Grand canal and the 
Four Great Rivers Improvement projects, deregulation of the restrictions 
on the development of the capital region, support for a construction 
economy, and the easing of curbs on real estate speculation—are centered on 
construction and development projects. It is important to examine the state’s 
construction-oriented and development-centered policies and suggest new 
policy alternatives. However, as this has been done by many scholars and 
civic organizations, this paper aims to uncover the underlying factors driving 
these policies by analyzing and explaining how South Korea’s construction-
orientation developmentalism has evolved. It first answers the following 
question: are the construction-oriented policies unique to the Lee Myung Bak 
government? or, regardless of what specific regime is governing, is it an issue 
of a more general structural and strategic selectivity of the Korean state?
Here, it is argued that the problems arising from construction-oriented 
policies and their side effects do not originate from a specific individual 
government’s policy direction or ideological preference, but from the 
strategic selectivity of the South Korean state. This argument is based on 
the fact that South Korean state’s construction-oriented selectivity has been 
augmented and intensified continuously, and furthermore, most political 
forces, including both the governing and opposition parties, have not shown 
significantly different opinions regarding the present construction-oriented, 
developmentalist projects. In fact, the state’s pro-construction orientation 
started from the time of the Roh Moo Hyun (No Muhyŏn) government, 
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said to be more progressive than the current Lee Myung Bak government. 
As resistance to and criticism of several regional development projects that 
were pursued by the previous Kim Dae Jung (Taejung) and Roh Moo Hyun 
governments—such as the Saemangŭm project, Kyŏngin canal construction, 
nuclear waste dump construction, new town development in the capital 
region, the city of Administration complex, the enterprise city, the innovative 
city, S-project, and so on—are similar to current debates, some scholars have 
explained and criticized the state’s construction orientation using the concept 
of neo-developmentalism (cho, M. 2003; Byeon, c. 2005; Hong, S. 2005). 
Thus, an important contribution for scholars to make is to explain the 
evolution of South Korea’s path to this extreme construction orientation in 
terms of cause and effect, rather than through a particular evaluation of Lee 
Myung Bak government’s construction-oriented policies. The purpose of this 
paper, therefore, is to explain the evolution of South Korea’s construction 
orientation, in particular analyzing how the boom of developmental politics 
based on territorial interests has influenced the formation of the state’s 
construction-oriented tendency. 
II.  cRITIcAL REVIEw oF DEBATES oN NEo-
DEVELoPMENTALISM
The debate on neo-developmentalism began in 2000, when conflicts between 
development and preservation intensified over state-led development projects 
such as the Saemangŭm project and nuclear waste dump construction. Some 
progressive scholars started to criticize the government’s pro-development 
position and called it “neo-developmentalism.” cho Myung-Rae (2003: 50) 
stated, “on the surface, the government emphasizes the preservation and 
value of the environment, but in reality, it promotes development, and we call 
this neo-developmentalism.” The paradigm of neo-developmentalism was 
used to show that even under the governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
Moo Hyun, thought to be comparatively more liberal and more tolerant of 
civil society involvement, state-led projects were paradoxically geared towards 
development over environmental protection and preservation. Based on this 
awareness, cho (2003) defines neo-developmentalism as “the phenomenon of 
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our society’s ‘development inertia’ working in a new way within a society that 
still prefers an expanding economy, featuring utilization of the environment 
according to the market logic of neo-liberalism.” After this initial attempt 
to interpret South Korea’s construction- and development-oriented policies 
as “neo-developmentalism,” “neo-developmentalism” became a conceptual 
umbrella encompassing critiques of state policies favoring development over 
the eco-system and environment, quantitative growth and commercialization 
of space and place over quality of life, protection of regional communities, 
and state-led economic competitiveness policy over balanced regional 
development; this “theory of the construction-oriented state,” questioning the 
state’s overemphasis on infrastructure construction, has been much discussed 
since the mid-2000s. 
The important issues that neo-developmentalism and construction-
oriented state theory suggest can be summarized in two parts. First, neo-
developmentalism appeared when the hegemony of developmentalism, 
which has been maintained under the Korean developmental state and 
state-led economic growth, was combined with neoliberalism, which 
speeds up the commodification of space and environment. Regarding this 
point, cho (2003) shows how “developmentalism” employs “behaviors and 
concepts that ideologically embrace the value of exploitation and use of 
natural environment or natural resources,” and discusses how this type of 
developmentalism had been the fundamental ideology of the past thirty to 
forty years in South Korean society, politics, economy, and daily culture. cho 
argues that this ideology operates as a hegemonic discourse and philosophy 
that extends from individual behavior to national policies. He also points 
out that this developmentalism grew and materialized within the milieu of 
state-led artificial economic development, based on strong leadership and 
repressive rule against the general public during the process of capitalistic 
industrialization (cho, M. 2003). Since the 1990s, this developmentalist 
ideology has been combined with neoliberalism, which argues that allowing 
individual freedom in the market is the best way to improve welfare, by 
consolidating the concepts of space and environment commodification and 
developmentalism together, resulting in “neo-developmentalism.” 
Second, the material base of neo-developmentalism’s emergence and 
expansion is a construction alliance that grew and was consolidated under 
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the developmental state. This construction alliance is based on connections 
between the land-construction interests of politicians, the state (especially the 
key bureaucrats composing the core of government-affiliated development 
organs, state-owned enterprises responsible for development, various 
government-affiliated research institutes on urban and regional development, 
etc.), capitalists (especially those involved in construction and development-
related areas), media, and academia (Hong, S. 2005; choi, J. 2003; oh, K. 
2003; chung, K. 2003). Thus, some scholars call the South Korean state a 
“construction-oriented state,” emphasizing that this construction alliance 
greatly influences both policy making for and implementation of state-led 
projects. 
For the last forty years, systematic study of this important aspect South 
Korea’s state behavior, labeled “developmentalism” or “construction-
orientation,” has been rare; the concept of neo-developmentalism and 
construction-oriented state theory are therefore very useful tools to explain 
South Korea’s path. Furthermore, this state-led construction orientation 
is found not only in South Korea, but also is common in other Asian 
countries such as Japan and Taiwan (of course, the specific development 
formation is different for each).1 However, as there is in general not much 
research done on this trend in East Asian developmental states, analyzing 
and conceptualizing how and through what kinds of political, economic, 
social, and spatial processes Asian countries become construction-oriented 
and developmentalistic would be a major contribution to understanding 
contemporary Asian societies. Still, the current literature on neo-
developmentalism and the construction-oriented state seems to be lacking in 
a few areas. 
1 The word “construction state” was used to emphasize the negative social and political 
effects of construction-oriented public works in Japan, where construction enterprises 
make up an especially large portion of the total economic activity (woo, S. 2004). 
Gavan Mccormack (2002) points out that the Japanese state faces a debt crisis due to 
the fact that Japan is under the system of a “construction state” and that this system is 
maintained by the “Iron Triangle” of politicians and bureaucrats, financial enterprises, 
and construction companies. These arguments are supported by Table 1, which shows 
that South Korea and Japan have a higher percentage of construction industries as a 
percentage of GDP than other oEcD countries.
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First, the explanation and understanding of the materiality of and 
ontological basis for the rise of neo-developmentalism are insufficient. They 
consider neo-developmentalism as a result of hegemonized discourses, 
where “developmentalist” ideology and discourses have penetrated into the 
Korean society and been combined with neoliberal ideology. No systematic 
or empirical analysis is offered to explain what the material conditions are at 
Table 1. construction Industries as Percent of GDP in oEcD countries (1980-2000)















































































































































































Source: the Bank of Korea (2004).
 Territorial Politics and the Rise of a construction-oriented State in South Korea 191
the base of hegemonized developmentalist discourses, and through what kind 
of political and economic processes the developmentalist discourses become 
combined with neoliberalism. Previous debates on neo-developmentalism 
locate the material basis for the expansion of developmentalism in the 
formation of development coalitions or construction alliances. However, no 
specific explanation is given for what kind of political and economic interests 
and social relations ground the establishment of development coalitions and 
construction alliances and the process by which they came to influence the 
state actions. 
Moreover, the more pressing problem is that the literature tends to 
look at the formation and behavior of development coalitions only at the 
national level. It is true that political and economic interests were formed 
and developed in relation to the continuation and expansion of development 
and construction projects promoted at the national scale, but one needs to 
pay attention to the fact that, in reality, the majority of development projects 
are pursued based on the territorial interests defined at the urban and local 
scales.
Usually, the introduction of local or regional development politics is 
considered to have emerged after the enactment of political decentralization 
(in the 1990s) in South Korea, but actually, regional development politics 
were operating even before the start of decentralization. For example, in 1965, 
a Development conference was held in Taegu to attract industrial complex 
construction and expand local roads by the city of Taegu and its chamber of 
commerce. They invited several national cabinet-level officials such as the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of construction 
in order to help obtain the central government’s support for these 
development projects. The mayor of Taegu even wrote a letter requesting 
President Park Jung Hee (Pak chŏnghŭi) to attend the event (Park, B. 2003). 
Around this time as well, in the city of Kwangju and in chŏnnam Province, 
the governor of chŏnnam, along with the mayor of Kwangju, the Kwangju 
chamber of commerce, and assembly members from the region, formed 
various development alliances such as the Asia Motor Factory Establishment 
committee (1962), the Kwangju Industrial complex Promotion committee 
(May 1962), the Mistreatment of Kwangju correction committee (September 
1966), the Honam Rights Movement committee (1968), the chŏnnam 
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Province Modernization Promotion committee (1970), and the chŏnnam 
Development Promotion committee (1971), in an enormous great effort to 
gain the central government’s support for development projects for Kwangju 
and chŏnnam Province (Jung, K. 1991; Park, B. 2003; Kim, D. 2009).
Also, in the late 1960s, regional development politics intensified around 
the Kyŏngbu Highway construction project, one of the largest construction 
projects of all-time. In Kwangju and chŏnnam Province, critical public 
opinion spread that the construction of Kyŏngbu Highway would intensify 
regional economic disparities and expand the isolation of Kwangju and 
chŏnnam Province, and this became the major lobbying issue for assembly 
members from Kwangju and chŏnnam Province. These processes then 
became the main basis for the further formation of regionalist politics, which 
appeared in the early 1970s. This kind of regionally organized and mobilized 
development politics existed as far back as the 1960s, when the centralization 
of authority was extreme, and it significantly affected the national policy 
making processes.
Another case of important territorial politics expressed at the local scale is 
the recent issue of the Grand canal construction project and related political 
debate. The Lee Myung Bak government’s ambitious Korean Peninsula Grand 
canal project, which began as Lee took office, is a typical case revealing the 
neo-developmentalist characteristics of the government. Scholars against 
this project led a national anti-development movement marked by extensive 
protest. This debate on the Korean Peninsula Grand canal project was won 
by the anti-development coalition, and the Lee government announced on 
June 19, 2008 that it would in effect withdraw the project. The overall canal 
construction project was defeated at the national scale by strong resistance, 
but at the local scale the canal project still proceeds in various pieces. 
Problematically, aligned with territorial interests at the local scale, some of the 
activists who opposed the national canal project now approve of small-scale 
canal construction projects, thus contradicting themselves. This indicates 
that the developmental interest groups’ collective support is still strong for 
construction-oriented development projects such as canal construction; 
these groups have the potential to significantly influence government policy 
making in the future. 
From the examples, if one accepts that regionally formed territorial 
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interests, and development politics based on those interests, significantly 
influence government policy decisions, looking for the material conditions of 
neo-developmentalism only in the nationally formed construction alliances 
is a very limited approach. Some of the literature on neo-developmentalism 
discusses the problem of local development alliances, but it falls short of 
giving a clear explanation of in what political, economic, and social contexts 
local development alliances are created and function. Also, some interpret 
local development alliances as a result of the expansion of centrally-formed 
development alliances since the start of decentralization (cho, M. 2003). 
Therefore, many overlook the fact that even before decentralization, local-
level territorial politics significantly influenced construction-oriented 
development projects. In sum, previous discussions of neo-developmentalism 
fail to grasp the fact that the spread of developmentalism is not just an 
ideological problem but is based on the materiality of locally created 
territorial interests.
Secondly, discussion of neo-developmentalism and the construction-
oriented state focuses on the state’s selectivity to prefer certain types of 
Figure 1. A conference on the construction of a canal in Yeongsan River, held in 
Gwangju on 19 April 2007. The slogan in the placard says, “Revive the waterway in 
Yeongsan River, the Lifeline of the Southwestern Region!”
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policies and projects, but the mechanism of how the Korean state has 
made its developmentalist and constructed-oriented selectivity is not fully 
explained. Besides discussion of the existence of development or construction 
alliances, an explanation of the political and economic motivations behind 
South Korean or other East Asian states’ construction-orientation does not 
clearly emerge. construction-oriented national development projects may 
help economic growth, but also they may inhibit capital accumulation at the 
level of national economy. Also, social conflicts from unreasonably imposed 
construction projects may not be helpful in establishing a state’s hegemonic 
legitimacy. Given these limitations to construction-led development projects, 
in that they can harm capital accumulation or lessen support for legitimacy 
of the existing political system, why and how the South Korean state shows 
selectivity towards construction development projects still needs to be 
explained. Is it just an expression of the pre-modern irrationality remained 
in the Korean society? or is it a result of the ignorance, incapacity, and 
moral deficiency of the political powers that be? If these explanations are 
not helpful, then scholars need to suggest more systematic and analytical 
explanations for the Korean state’s construction-oriented selectivity.
Therefore, this paper sheds light on the political, economic, and 
social processes undergirding the creation of South Korea’s construction-
oriented developmentalism using 1) strategi-relational state theory and 2) a 
theorization of development politics based on territorial interests. 
III.  A STRATEGIc-RELATIoNAL UNDERSTANDING oF THE 
STATE
The strategic-relational approach to the state has been developed by British 
sociologist Bob Jessop. Jessop (1990), influenced by Poulantzas’ state theory, 
critiqued both the reductionist or essentialist Marxist understandings of 
the capitalist state and the weberian view of the state emphasizing the state 
autonomy from social forces. For Jessop, although an economy (or capital) 
and politics (or the state) functionally depend on each other, this functional 
integration is always problematic due to institutional separation between the 
economy and politics. He argues that functional integration of economy and 
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politics is possible only through strategic activities, i.e. accumulation strategy 
or hegemonic projects, of both the state and social forces acting in and 
through the state. 
The core concept of strategic-relational state theory is a “state’s strategic 
selectivity.” A capitalist state always shows certain kinds of selectivity, 
privileging specific social forces, interests and actors over others’. In this 
light, Jessop challenges a reductionist or essentialist view to the state, which 
is based on the notion that the state cannot help but serve the interests of 
capitalist class or show such selectivity because of demand from capital 
accumulation. He argues that among diverse social forces acting in and 
through the state, through constantly continued social and political struggles 
and mutual interactions, a state’s selectivity is constructed, and he calls 
this “strategic selectivity.” In other words, although it is conditioned and 
constrained by the economic necessity for capital accumulation and the 
political necessity of maintaining the legitimacy of the existing social-political 
order, a state’s selectivity is made through strategies of diverse social forces 
and their interactions; these strategies are selected on the basis of complex 
and sometimes coincidental judgments of social forces within specific 
historical, social, political, and geographical conditions and situations. In this 
sense, Jessop acknowledges “the state as political strategy” and explains that 
the state power is based not on what the state possesses, but on what comes 
from the social forces acting in and through the state; in other words, the 
state’s institutionalized powers and duties are defined through the specifically 
defined and situated relations and interactions among these social forces 
under certain political and economic contexts.
Building on Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to the state, Brenner 
(2004) tries to spatialize the state theory by focusing on the spatial explanation 
of a state’s “strategic selectivity”. In order to do this, Brenner first suggests the 
concepts of “state spatial project” and “state spatial strategy,” which explain 
state actions from a spatial perspective. Here, the “state spatial project,” as a 
spatial framework of political regulation, represents the strategic expression 
of the state’s distinctive form of spatial organization as a discrete, territorially 
centralized, self-contained, and internally differentiated institutional 
apparatus. Thus, state spatial projects internationally stipulate state-regulated 
space as a closed territory, in order to obtain uniform integration of a state’s 
196 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011
territory, and internally differentiate state activities among different levels 
of territorial administration and coordinate state policies among diverse 
locations and scales. on the other hand, “state spatial strategy” is associated 
with the ways in which state institutions are mobilized to regulate social 
relations and to influence their locational geographies. Specifically, it refers 
to the state activities to plan and implement various policies that have direct 
or indirect spatial effects such as industrial policies, economic development 
plans, infrastructure construction, regional policies, urban policies, labor 
market policies, and so on. In this sense, the construction-oriented state 
development projects can be understood as a form of the state spatial strategy. 
The “state spatial project” and the “state spatial strategy” tend to result 
in favoritism toward specific regions, spaces, and scales over others, and 
this phenomenon is called “spatial selectivity.” Brenner explains this “spatial 
selectivity” in terms of strategic relational processes. In other words, based 
on strategic relational interactions among various social forces acting in and 
through the state, state spatial projects and strategies are created, reflecting 
a few selected interests’ accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. 
These spatial projects and strategies, therefore, show a certain kind of spatial 
selectivity. In understanding the strategic relations that construct a state’s 
spatial selectivity, Brenner pays special attention to the path-dependent 
influences of the existing spatial organizations of the state. In other words, as 
a result of strategic relational interactions, once the specific institutionalized 
arrangement, framework, and spatial selectivity are formed, they in turn 
affect strategic relational interactions among social forces and interests at 
the next stage. This strategic relational interaction affects a state’s spatial 
form and spatial selectivity, and this revolving process is repeated. Based 
on this reasoning, Brenner argues that state spatial selectivity is a result of a 
dialectical interaction between: 1) inherited patterns (for example, territorial 
partitionings, scalar configurations, etc.) of state spatial organization; and 2) 
emergent state spatial projects and strategies that aim to modify or reshape 
the entrenched spatial form of the state. Through this process of dialectical 
interaction, a state’s spatial form and selectivity are ceaselessly evolving and 
constantly being restructured. Therefore, the processes of spatial and scalar 
restructuring of the state such as ‘glocalization’ and ‘decentralization’ that take 
place in many countries can be understood as the results of these changes 
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in state’s spatial form and selectivity stemming from strategic relational 
processes. 
From a strategic relational point of view, in order to explain South Korean 
state’s neo-developmentalism, and its construction-oriented nature, the 
following questions need to be answered:
1)  If one looks at this construction-orientation as one of the specifics that 
define South Korean state’s spatial form and selectivity, what are the 
political and economic processes that brought about this pattern?
2)  How has the construction-oriented nature of the Korean state developed 
in relation to the state’s accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects 
that are constructed through strategic relational interactions among 
diverse social forces acting in and through the state?
3)  How has the construction-oriented nature of the state affected subsequent 
strategic relational interactions among social interests?
4)  within these continuous changes and interaction processes, how has 
the construction-oriented nature of the Korean state changed and 
evolved? 
IV.  TERRIToRIAL INTERESTS MoBILIZATIoN AND 
DEVELoPMENTAL PoLITIcS
In order to fully answer the above questions, more systematic analysis of the 
construction alliances is necessary, as these alliances are the most important 
interest groups influencing state strategic selectivity of “developmentalism.” 
An understanding and explanation of the interest bases, the mechanisms 
through which members of the construction alliances form their coalitions, 
and how this kind of construction alliances influences state activities are 
needed. Previous discussions on the construction alliances have mainly 
focused on how and on what kinds of institutionalized and organizational 
interests the main actors promoting construction activities—politicians, 
bureaucrats, media, and academia—form construction alliances and initiate 
development projects (Hong, S. 2005). Although this attempt has contributed 
much towards explaining one important aspect of the construction alliance 
198 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011
formation and its operation, previous research has not paid enough attention 
to the role of development politics based on territorial interests, a key element 
of construction alliance formation. 
An analysis on the political actions based on territorial interests helps to 
explain construction-oriented developmentalism because of the inevitable 
place-based natures of construction projects. The state’s construction projects 
are a field in which place and spatial selectivity is more directly and clearly 
revealed than for any other state activities. construction projects clearly bring 
about benefits and costs at the national scale, their impact and side effects are 
more clearly seen at the local scale. Thus, locally dependent actors react very 
sensitively to positive or negative effects of construction projects at a specific 
place; as a result, each specific construction project features very different 
pros and cons. 
Furthermore, for construction projects there is inevitably a gap between 
exchange value and use value. construction projects may differentiate the 
use and exchange values of land and real estate, and hence the actors who 
are fixed and dependent on a specific place may have different benefits 
and costs depending on the location and ownership of the land and real 
estate they are associated with. coupled with the spatiality of construction 
projects, such differentiation of spatial values is a core condition that makes 
construction projects become an important political issue. considering the 
spatiality of these construction and development projects and consequential 
political competition and conflict, one must inevitably consider the territorial 
interests related to each construction project in explaining the formation of a 
construction alliance and a state’s construction-oriented tendency.
Then, through what process do political activities based on territorial 
interests appear? According to David Harvey and Kevin cox, territorial 
politics occur from dialectical interactions between mobility and fixity, two 
contrasting tendencies inherent in capitalism. Paying attention to competitive 
relations among capitalists in capitalist economies, Harvey (1982, 1985, 
1989) mentioned two contrasting strategies that capitalists deploy in order 
to best the competition: one is by developing better technology, designing 
a more efficient corporate organization, or selecting a better location where 
resources, infrastructure, market, and labor are easily attainable. The other 
way is to keep a competitive advantage by consolidating monopolistic control 
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of superior technology and location so that other capitalists cannot obtain 
such technology and location easily. According to Harvey, such contradictory 
relations between these two competitive strategies are the conditions that 
ultimately bring out territorial politics. 
The former of these two competitive strategies can be spatially expressed 
as capital’s ceasless search for new locations, which results in the tendency of 
capital mobility and the continuous instability of the capitalist space economy. 
The spatial expression of the latter strategy is the creation of ‘structured 
coherence’ in production, technology, social relations, consumption patterns, 
labor processes, class relations, and culture in a specific place or region, 
through which the monopoly of previously-obtained superior technologies 
and locational advantages can be secured and increased. These two conflicting 
tendencies are contradictory to each other; the structured coherence created 
in a specific place or region is constantly threatened by constant instability 
and the pressure for restructuring, stemming from the unstable characteristics 
of the capitalistic space economy. According to Harvey, such situations of the 
continuous instability and crisis tendencies appear unbearable to capital and 
labor, both of which are dependent on the structured coherence created in 
that region or place. Territorial politics arise as such place-dependent actors 
respond to this crisis. 
Thus, capital and labor attempt to maintain the circulation and accumulation 
of capital within their city and regional economy by protecting this structured 
coherence. However, this process is highly political, because policies to protect 
and save an urban or regional economy and the implementation of such 
policies do not equally distribute benefits to all social groups and interests. 
Moreover, if these policies that are carried out in the name of saving the 
urban or regional economy put more burden on residents of that city or 
region via additional fees and taxes, competing interests will easily clash, 
collide, and quarrel. In order to evade this situation, the social forces that 
try to protect an urban or regional economy can mobilize territorializing 
strategies by privileging territorial interests and identities over other social 
and political interests and identities based on class, gender, ethnicity, and 
so on. The result of such urban politics is the formation of regional class 
alliances in each city or region. Furthermore, such class alliances compete 
and oppose each other in order to maintain the structured coherence of the 
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cities, where they are dependent, and through this, competition and conflict 
among cities or regions can be created (Harvey 1985, 1989). In other words, 
certain forms of territoriality are created in cities or regions, and people are 
politically mobilized based on this, leading to the rise of territorial politics. 
Building on Harvey’s argument that the contradictory relations between 
mobility and fixity are the required condition for the rise of territorial 
politics, cox suggests that locally dependent actors can organize the politics 
of local economic development by forming growth coalitions in order to 
protect or enhance their place-dependent interests at the local scale (cox and 
Mair 1988; cox 1993). Because place-dependent interests are not just always 
related to exchange values of place but also related to use values of place, the 
actions aiming at protecting place-dependent interests do not always lead 
to developmental politics. However, in many cases, the actions aiming at 
attracting values created at the wider cicurlation of capital flows to the region, 
or capturing values made in or within that region, are likely turned out to be 
a form of developmental politics, which tries to attract outside capital to the 
region by improving the social and physical infrastructure of the place.
cox (1997, 1998) argues that in this process, territorial identities and 
ideologies can be strengthened in order to bring about political participation 
and agreement among the place-dependent actors whose bases are on use 
values rather than exchange values or the actors who have weaker place-
dependent interests. As a result, the processes of territorialization can 
occur. Here, territorialization means the social-political process by which 
“territory” is created. In particular, it is related to an effort to reinforce 
the boundness and exclusiveness of a place on the bases of certain place-
based ideologies and identities, to distinguish “us” and “others,” and to set 
down relational features in a specific direction within a specific place (Sack 
1986).2 The processes of territorialization increase cohesion and integration 
2 Territory refers to a portion of geographic space which is claimed or occupied by a 
person or group of persons or by an institution, and thus it is an area of ‘bounded 
space’ (Storey 2001: 1). Therefore, it should not be seen as pre-given or natural, but 
it is socially and politically constructed by human actions. In regards to this, Sack 
(1986) looks at the creation of territory through the perspective of power conflict and 
struggle, and he argues that the creation of territory is an effort to exercise influence 
and control over people, circumstances, and their relations as individuals or groups 
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within the place, and intensify territorial competition and conflict against 
other places. For a representative example of this territorialization process, 
Figure 2 shows a slogan (“Is one Really A Yŏju citizen if one opposes 
canal construction?” – (Yŏju Korean Peninsula Grand canal Promotion 
central committee), proclaiming that if one opposes the Korean Peninsula 
Grand canal construction project, he/she will be seen as being against Yŏju’s 
territorial interests. Such a process of territorialization makes opposition to 
specific developmental projects within the region unpalatable, bringing about 
full support from the region’s residents. 
In summary, in the process by which spatially-fixed and place-dependent 
actors try to protect or enhance their place-dependent interests in the capitalist 
space economy, which faces constant instability and change, territorial politics 
originate as actors engage in competition against other regions and politically 
mobilize territorial identities and interests. Based on this argument, it can 
be argued that the construction projects are directly tied to actors who have 
a stake in place-dependent and spatially-bound interests because of their 
spatial immobility and strong local effects on the use and exchange values of 
places. The locally dependent actors form development alliances or growth 
by setting boundaries on a specific region and claiming control of it. If one looks at 
territory through this perspective, the creation of territory and the establishment of 
boundaries are political strategies to achieve specific purposes, and the establishment 
of boundaries leads to the exclusion and inclusion of “us” and “others.” Territory is 
created by human activities aiming at occupying better positions in power struggles. 
Figure 2. Placard on Korean Peninsula Grand canal construction Project in the Region 
of Yŏju (February 2007).
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coalitions at the local scale and actively try to attract construction projects 
that can increase their place-dependent interests.
V.  TERRIToRIAL PoLITIcS AND THE STATE’S 
coNSTRUcTIoN-oRIENTED TENDENcY
Developmental politics based on these territorial interests occur in every 
capitalist society; however, the concrete forms of the territorial politics may 
be expressed in many different ways. Also, while developmental politics based 
on territorial interests may greatly affect state activities in some countries, in 
others it may not. why does such difference occur?  Under what conditions 
do developmental politics based on territorial interests affect state activities, 
especially a state’s strategic selectivity? we require a conceptual framework 
that will allow us to answer these questions in order to explain the Korean 
state’s construction orientation. 
As Brenner (2004) has argued, the capitalist state has spatial selectivity 
in its activities. The policies or strategies of the state tend to privilege certain 
regions or spatial scales over others under strategic interactions among 
various social actors acting in and through the state. The state’s spatial 
selectivity can be expressed in diverse ways, such as in explicit spatial policies 
by which a specific region or city receives much more support and benefits 
from the state, or in aspatial policies like industrial, trade or investment 
policies by which, nonetheless, a specific region or city implicitly receives 
disproportionate benefits. Such spatial selectivity of state behavior becomes 
an important factor that explains economic development and growth 
differentials between localities or between cities.
In the case where uneven regional development is greatly influenced 
by the spatial selectivity of state behavior, regional competition and conflict 
can be provoked by state policies and strategies. when disadvantaged by the 
state’s spatial selectivity, some regions or cities will criticize or challenge state 
policies and strategies, while favored regions or cities will be more likely to try 
to continue working the spatial selectivity of the state to their benefit. when 
competition and conflict over a state’s policies and strategies intensify, territorial 
politics may arise to protect and enhance the place-dependent interests of local 
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actors on the basis of the mobilization of a specific region’s territorial identity 
and interests. The result is the intensification of regional conflict, emergence of 
regionalist politics, and intensification of center-local conflict.3
Such conflict between localities or between scales is a serious threat to 
maintaining national unity. In order to resolve this, the state may implement 
several spatial strategies and spatial projects as a hegemonic project to 
appease regional competition and conflicting situations. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that the states in all capitalist economies implement various 
policies to resolve regional disparities and to mitigate regional conflicts 
despite variations in the degree of differentiation. 
A state’s spatial strategies and spatial projects become more or less 
development-oriented according to the degree of political mobilization of 
territorial interests. Because the magnitude of mobilization of territorial 
politics at the local scale can be very high, when regional competition or 
conflict, or center-local conflict, is intense, it is not easy to mediate various 
local interests and demands. As a result, it is likely for state policies to become 
more construction-oriented in order to fulfill territorial demands. on the 
other hand, when territorial interests are mobilized inadequately and other 
political mobilization mechanisms such as class, race, or religion become 
more important issues, it is easier to control territorial interests nationally, 
and the state is less influenced by local or regional demands for development. 
Then, what kinds of conditions increase the levels of the political 
mobilization of territorial interests? Although numerous conditions operate 
in complex ways, three conditions are mentioned here to help explain the 
construction-oriented tendency of the Korean state. 
The first condition is the structure of political cleavage. It is important to 
know how party politics work. Parties organize and compete to get power and 
votes in a democratic political system. Therefore, parties must organize their 
political bases in order to win an election, and as a result, a political cleavage 
structure of interests is formed. In order to win an election, parties must 
search for various sources of political cleavage, such as class, race, region, and 
3 See Park, B. (2003) for a representative case study that interprets South Korea’s 
regionalist politics as a result of uneven development conditioned by the state’s spatial 
selectivity and the resultant territorial politics. 
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religion. If regionally-based political-economic interests and identity issues 
are used to form a party’s support base, then a political cleavage structure 
will be created based on regional and territorial interests. Even though 
class conflict, the main contradiction of capitalism, affects political cleavage 
structures, it is only contingent if class conflict turns out to be the main factor. 
If the labor movement is nationally organized, based on strong class solidarity 
and politically closely associated with a specific party, then class politics will 
be vigorous, and class interests are more likely to be used as the main sources 
of political mobilization (Taylor and Johnston 1979). If  this is not the case, 
then other factors such as regionalism, race, and religion are likely to be used 
for political base construction. 
In the case of South Korea, the country experienced rapid development of 
capitalism and intense labor-management conflict, but class politics did not 
grow as the main dimension of party politics; thus, class politics has had little 
effect on the formation of political cleavage structures. In this void, parties 
looked for other ways to mobilize supporters, and regional interests are 
one route they found. The developmental state pursued state-led economic 
growth, and its spatial selectivity caused the problems of regional economic 
disparity. This intensified regional conflict and competition regarding 
governmental policies. This condition of underdeveloped class politics led 
parties to create their political support base by mobilizing territorial interests 
at the regional scale. The result is the current South Korean politics of 
regional cleavage (Park, B. 2003). 
when political cleavage structures are organized around regions in this 
way, developmental demands that are based on territorial interests will be 
even more magnified and reproduced by parties and politicians, and will 
more profoundly affect government policy. If political cleavage structures 
are organized around non-regional factors such as class, the involvement of 
parties and politicians in developmental politics based on territorial interests 
will be greatly weakened, and this will have the effect of weakening a state’s 
construction orientation.4
4 It is possible to interpret Japan’s construction-oriented state as magnified and 
reproduced by the effects of a similar territorialization of politics. Traditionally 
in Japan, pork barrel politics—local parliamentary members trying to exchange 
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The second condition intensifying the territorial politics is the spatial scale 
at which territorial interests are mobilized. Territorial interests can be defined 
and mobilized at various geographical scales. In fact, the emergence of nation-
states is a result of the mobilization and institutionalization of territorial 
interests at the national scale. This does not mean that territorial interests 
are not mobilized when class politics are active and a social democratic 
political system is instituted. In such cases, territorial interests are mobilized 
at the national scale and expressed as inter-national competition for capital 
accumulation. However, the degree of territorial interest mobilization at the 
local scale is comparatively weak. In contrast, the emergence of regionalist 
politics or local party politics greatly increases the possibility of territorial 
interests being mobilized at a geographical scale below the national scale.
The other important factor that influences the geographical scale in which 
territorial interests are mobilized is a state’s spatial form, especially at what 
scale regulatory processes are mainly taking place. with the centralization of 
the political system, if the state’s regulatory processes are taking place at the 
national scale and political decision making at the local level is less important, 
then the territorialization processes of politics at the local scale can be weak. 
However, with decentralization of the state, if local government decision-
making becomes important, then the processes of territorialization can 
become active at the local scale. After decentralization in South Korea, the 
rise of small-scale regionalism and intensification of inter-local competition 
votes and central government grants—were widespread (Fukui and Fukai 1996). 
Before the medium-constituency electorate system was replaced with the single-
district electorate system in 1993, under the long-term ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party, Liberal Democratic candidates were competing with each other in the same 
electoral districts (Grofman et al. 1999; Katz 1986). As a result, ideological and policy 
differences between parties and interest groups had less of an effect on election results, 
and instead, it became very important which one among various Liberal Democratic 
candidates was more capable in lobbying the central government. Therefore, the 
important factor deciding electoral outcomes became who represented a region’s 
interests better (Grofman 1999: 390). In other words, stimulation of territorial 
interests became an important factor in party politics. In this situation, individual 
politicians were stroved to attract central government grants for public construction 
projects that represented territorial interests; this became the basis for growth and 
continuation of the Japanese construction-oriented state. 
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have been influenced by the changes in the state’s spatial structure. 
Along with this, the geographical scale at which the interests of capital are 
defined also influences the geographical scale of the territorialization. with 
the development of capitalism, the monopoly of capital intensifies and the 
size of firms becomes bigger, but each country shows different characteristics 
in its spatial scale at which the interests of capital are defined. For instance, 
the United States has a higher percentage of local companies operating in 
economic activities than Britain has. The utility companies in the U.S. that 
provide electricity, water, and gas are local firms based on specific regions, 
and hence they play a very important role in the formation of territorialized 
developmental politics. on the other hand, Britain has more nationally 
organized companies; thus, territorialized developmental politics at the local 
scale are less active than in the United States (wood 1996). In South Korea, 
large conglomerates occupy a much larger portion in the economy than 
locally-based small businesses, so that the role of industrial capital is minor 
in the territorial politics at the local scales. Nevertheless, it does not mean 
that locally based companies do not exist. Some companies do have strong 
place-based interests at the local scale, especially in the form of construction 
companies or local media, and they make up important parts of t’oho 
(powerful local landed families), playing a key role in developmental politics 
based on territorial interests. 
The third factor is the structure of discourse that interprets a region’s 
political and economic “reality.” Regional territorial politics are mobilized, 
and the way in which actors interpret the region’s political economic situation 
is oftentimes different from the region’s actual political economic reality. 
Various alienation theories, such as the Honam alienation theory and the 
Jibang (the regions outside of the Seoul Metropolitan Region) alienation 
theory that are popular in South Korea play a very important role in the 
mobilization of territorial politics. Yet, these alienation theories are not based 
on a correct interpretation of that region’s political and economic “reality.” 
Influenced by regionalist politics that appeared in the 1960s and the 1970s, 
South Korean locals have interpreted political and economic reality based on 
the beliefs that 1) state-led development projects greatly influence a region’s 
economic development, and 2) the distribution of such development projects 
to localities is influenced by the regional home of the main power figures 
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in the central government. This interpretation regards relationships with 
the central power as more important than each region’s objective economic 
condition or historical development path. This shows how territorial 
developmental politics mostly revolves around regional equity and spatial 
selectivity of the central government’s development projects in South Korea. 
Regional bids for national development projects result in blind bidding for 
the central government’s development projects without serious consideration 
of whether that national development project will improve the standard of 
living and local economy.
VI.  HISToRIcAL PRocESSES oF SoUTH KoREA’S  
coNSTRUcTIoN-oRIENTED NEo-DEVELoPMENTALIST 
STATE FoRMATIoN: AN ExPLoRAToRY ExPLANATIoN
1.  State-led Economic Growth and the Formation of a ‘Construction-
Oriented Developmental State’
In the 1960s and 1970s the ‘construction-oriented developmental state’ 
first emerged in South Korea with two early characteristics. First was the 
growth of a construction bureaucracy and construction capital. Under 
state-led industrialization, the state invested in large scale, social and 
physical infrastructures, constructed various industrial complexes, and 
pursued various regional development projects. As a result, government 
ministries related to construction and the construction industry grew rapidly. 
Furthermore, based on the growth coalition between the state and chaebŏls 
(large conglomerates), the connection between construction bureaucrats 
and construction conglomerates was strengthened. The second characteristic 
was that regional development-dependent political interests grew. Under the 
influence of regionalist politics that appeared during this period, mechanisms 
that mobilized political support based on regional interests were established. 
As a result, the state’s regional development projects became a main interest 
of parties and politicians. Based on this growth of regional development-
dependent political interests, developmentalist discourses became a 
hegemonic ideology in South Korean society.
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Now, we need to look at how these two characteristics arose in relation 
to strategic relational interactions among varios social forces with regards 
to South Korea’s state strategies and state form of that time. First, we can 
summarize the South Korean developmental state’s state strategies and state 
form as follows. Regarding state strategies, the South Korean state, based 
on export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s and heavy and chemical 
industrialization in the 1970s, pursued an accumulation strategy aiming at 
maximizing the efficiency in economic growth through intensive mobilization 
of capital and labor. In addition, the South Korean government practiced 
hegemonic projects that included the establishment of political legitimacy 
through achieving national economic growth and delivering wealth to the 
people, the neutralization of political opposition through repressive and 
authoritarian political practices, the mobilization of regionalist political 
support, and the active utilization of ideologies such as modernization 
theory and anti-communism within its repressive political system. The 
state form was characterized as follows: 1) in terms of the form of political 
representation, an authoritarian regime that secured the state’s superior 
position over civil society by repressing political activities and weakening 
parliamentary democracy, and 2) in terms of the spatial form, the 
construction of a exclusive regulatory space within the national territory, the 
establishment of highly centralized state territoriality, and a strong tendency 
of spatial selectivity in the state activities promoting accumulation strategies 
and hegemonic projects.
These conditions have led to 1) the growth of construction bureaucrats 
and capital, and 2) the emergence of regional development-dependent 
political forces by influencing the strategic relational interactions among 
social forces, and eventually contributed to the rise of a construction-oriented 
developmental state in South Korea. More concrete mechanisms can be 
explained as follows.
1) Under state-led economic development strategies, the state had 
to develop physical infrastructure in order to deliver and use resources 
efficiently.5 This is evident in the use of foreign loans. At that time, when 
5 of course, some of this was necessary for national economic development, but at the 
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capital for economic development was scarce, foreign loans were actively 
sought; most of these foreign loans were invested in physical infrastructure. 
For example, from 1959 to 1969, 45.9% of foreign loans were invested in 
manufacturing and 47.82% in physical infrastructure (Seoul Social Science 
Research center 1991: 183). Such vast amounts of investment in physical 
infrastructure construction resulted in the increased role of the construction 
administration, which mostly handled national land development as a part 
of economic development. This provided a chance for the construction 
bureaucracy and capital to grow in South Korea.
2) The authoritarian state form resulted in the immature development of 
political and civil societies and an immature class politics due to a repressive 
political system and labor regulation. In this situation, parties and political 
forces created a cleavage structure that tried to get political support based 
on the ideological binary of authoritarianism vs. democracy. However, this 
cleavage structure lacked material foundation, and parties and political 
interests continuously sought complementary cleavage factors.
3) Spatial selectivity of state strategies and form resulted in the creation 
of locally differentiated interests. First, under a centralized state structure, 
local interests had to mobilize the central government’s support and 
authorization for regional development. However, the state’s accumulation 
strategies showed clear spatial selectivity, so that government investment 
and support for industry and regional development became concentrated in 
the Seoul Metropolitical Region and in the southeast region, and this caused 
regional economic disparities. Additionally, because of the state’s hegemonic 
project of maintaining legitimacy through mobilization of regionalism (e.g. 
pro-government regionalism in the southeast) and recruitment of people 
based on regionally based social networks, territorial interests based on the 
Yŏngnam region (the southeast) were better represented politically. Under 
same time, national projects such as nation building, post-war recovery, and territory 
reconstruction that had continued ever since independence from Japan and the 
Korea war had also contributed to the creation of the Korean state’s path-dependent 
tendency to privilege the physical infrastructure development.
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a combination of these conditions, differentiated interests were constructed 
in different regions in relation to the regulatory practices of the state; thus, 
there appeared a sense of alienation and anti-government regionalism in the 
Honam region (the southwest), while arising pro-government regionalist 
discourses in the Yŏngnam region.
4) with the articulation of the above two conditions, the interests of 
parties and politicians in regional development issues increased. Besides 
the basic cleavage structure of “authoritarianism vs. anti-authoritarianism,” 
political forces that were trying to find a complementary cleavage factor 
began trying to secure their support base by politically mobilizing regional 
interests that were discriminatingly created by regional economic disparities. 
Especially, on the basis of regional disparities and regionally-differentiated 
political interests and sentiments like the anti-government sentiment 
in the southwest and the pro-government sentiment in the southeast, 
territorialization strategies of political forces that were trying to win support 
started to appear in full scale in the 1971 Presidential election. The Yŏngnam-
Honam opposition structure emerged, and regionalist politics grew as a 
result. Seizing the opportunity, political forces started to secure their support 
bases by mobilizing regional political-economic interests and sentiments, the 
regional economic disparities, regional alienation, and the call for regional 
development. 
5) As social discontent over state-led industrialization since the 1960s 
and authoritarian control started to be expressed in full scale from the end 
of the 1960s, and as an effort to subdue this discontent and ensure political 
legitimacy, the state implemented various rural and urban development 
policies as a hegemonic project from the 1970s. i) Social discontent over 
state-led industrialization could not be expressed as class-struggle as a result 
of strong ideological influences of anti-communism and political repression 
of class-based movements. However, as one can see in the case of regionalist 
sentiment of alienation in the Honam region, discontent over the unfairness 
of state-led industrialization became a political issue with regards to regional 
inequality. In this situation, the state began to carry out regional policies 
that focused on dispersing populations and industries from big cities to the 
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provinces from the early 1970s, and along with this, the state implemented 
the 1st comprehensive National Land Development Plan in 1972. In this 
manner, various regional development projects came into being. ii) Also, 
because of the spatial selectivity in the state interventions in the economy, 
populations in big cities and their metropolitan areas (especially, the Seoul 
Metropolitan area) increased dramatically, and this led to congestion in 
cities like Seoul. This in turn increased the need for the spatial expansion of 
Seoul. It also led to housing problems for urban workers and increased the 
need for housing provisions. As a result, the reconstruction of urban areas 
and housing provision policies were initiated in full force in the 1970s. These 
regional, urban, and housing policies called for full implementation of large-
scale construction projects and a vast amount of investment in national land 
development, which led to an increased national budget for construction, 
and the expansion of the construction industry; this contributed to a 
strengthening of the state’s construction-oriented tendency.
6) At the start of the 1970s, the authoritarian Yushin regime was established 
by Park in order to resolve the political-economic crisis of the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s. Spatial selectivity and form of political representation of this 
regime contributed greatly to the strengthening of construction alliances and 
developmentalism. i) The Yushin regime strengthened the spatial selectivity 
of the state by concentrating the construction of industrial complexes for 
heavy and chemical industrialization in the Yŏngnam region, which resulted 
in the intensification of the economic gap between the Yŏngnam and Honam 
regions. It also reinforced a bias towards people from the Yŏngnam region 
when selecting national governing elites. Given this, political and economic 
interests and sentiments became much more differentiated among different 
regions. ii) Also, under the Yushin regime, indirect presidential elections 
were held and crack-downs on the opposition party intensified. Via the 
parliamentary electoral system, representative politics were drastically 
weakened, but the weakened regionalist politics among party competitors led 
to a rise of regionalism mobilized by individual politicians who used regional 
development issues as a tool. In other words, when competition between 
parties weakened, individual candidates tried to win the hearts of voters 
by highlighting the question of “how well will the candidate perform for 
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regional development in his relationship with central authorities?” Through 
this process of promoting regional development projects, the local legislative 
members’ lobby of the central government became stronger. As a result, 
development alliances that linked the center to local areas began to emerge. 
In other words, a link between local legislative members, local government, 
interest groups within the region (e.g. chamber of commerces), the central 
bureaucracy (construction ministry, Finance ministry), and construction 
companies became more important, and this led to an intensification of 
construction alliances and expansion and reproduction of developmentalist 
discourses.
The state’s construction-oriented tendency of the 1960s and the 1970s was 
continuously strengthened in the 1980s, which was related to the expansion 
of various urban or regional development projects. In the 1970s, the problems 
of state-led industrialization, such as labor exploitation and a rise of the urban 
poor, rose to surface in full force. In this situation, citizens protested against 
repressive systems and the demand for democratization spread. In response, 
several hegemonic projects related to urban and local development were 
pursued. 1) As a result of the Kwangju Democratization Movement following 
the Kwangju massacre, regional conflict and regionalist politics intensified. 
In response, regional development policies expanded. 2) In order to provide 
housing in urban areas, the state pursued the development of large-scale 
apartment complexes. 3) As parts of the hegemonic projects, bids to host the 
1986 Asian Games and 1988 olympic Games were sought. Then, to prepare, 
urban redevelopment projects on a grand scale ensued. Thus, construction 
alliances expanded and multiplied. 
Along with this, in the 1980s, regionalist politics expanded and intensified, 
and it was the period that the region became the core divisional structure 
for South Korean politics. Especially through the Kwangju Democratization 
Movement in the Honam region, anti-government and resistant regionalism 
intensified while in the Yŏngnam region, pro-government and hegemonic 
regionalism prevailed. Additionally, after the 1987 Democratization Movement, 
as formal democratization took a big step forward, the ‘authoritarianism vs. 
democracy’ cleavage structure that had essentially defined South Korean 
politics in the previous period weakened, and the spatial division element 
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came into the void. Democratic movement groups were divided regionally, 
and several regionally-based political forces emerged. Regional interests thus 
became mobilized in full force, and accordingly, the dependency of political 
forces on regional development increased even more. 
2.  Conversion from a ‘Construction-oriented Developmental State’ to a 
‘Neoliberal Construction-oriented State’
Entering the 1990s, the South Korean developmental state experienced 
fundamental changes in its strategies and characteristics. So-called neoliberalism 
began. This change was brought about by responses of the national ruling elites 
to destruction of the existing developmental model and the resultant crises 
of accumulation and legitimacy. The existing developmental model had been 
based on “state-led intensive mobilization of labor and capital” from the 
1960s to the 1980s, but its effectiveness became greatly weakened from the 
late 1980s under various internal and external challenges. After the late 1980s, 
facing external conditions of intensification of international competition and 
the end of the cold war, South Korea, which had established an exclusive 
regulatory space under nationalistic economic policies, was pressured to 
open its markets and liberalize trade. Internally, with democratization and 
the consequent growth of the labor movement, a system of repressive labor 
regulation collapsed. And, with the increasing autonomy of capital from the 
state due to the economic growth from the 1960s to the 1980s, the state’s 
intensive mobilization of capital became very difficult. This situation brought 
about accumulation and legitimacy crises for the governing elites, as economic 
growth began to decline after the late 1980s, and social movement groups 
continued to challenge the authoritarian regime.
In response to these crises, national ruling elites have attempted to 
reformulate the state strategies. First, in terms of the accumulation strategy, 
they tried to resolve the accumulation crisis by reorganizing the economic 
structure to be more market-friendly on the basis of the ideologies of 
neoliberalism and globalization. Second, in response to continuing 
challenges from social movement groups, they promoted expansion of 
procedural democratization, political-economic reforms, and some re-
distributive policies as a hegemonic project. However, such reorganization 
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of state strategies provided the opportunity for construction interests and 
developmental ideology to strengthen and expand at the national and local 
scales through several social groups’ strategic relational interactions. 
Housing and local development policies were expanded; this is evident 
from three sides. First, the urban population had drastically increased as 
a result of economic growth; construction-related bureaucrats and the 
construction industries formed an alliance; real estate speculation in urban 
areas became chronic, and South Korean urban housing prices showed a 
drastic increase in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In order to appease 
the angry urban middle class and renters, the state carried out housing 
provision campaigns such as the 200 Million Unit Housing construction 
Project. Secondly, because of intensified regionalist politics in the 1980s, 
regional interests became the core of the political cleavage structure. As a 
result, parties and political groups openly tried to strengthen and preserve 
their political support base, focusing on the regional economic disparities 
and regional development issues. In response, the state expanded several 
regional development projects aiming at promoting more balanced regional 
development like the west coast Development Project. Thirdly, along 
with the expansion of several development projects, the state graducally 
relaxed various restrictions on development. with increasing demand for 
democratization and the rising influence of neoliberal ideology, public 
dissatisfaction with the state’s restrictions on political and economic activities 
intensified, leading to the relaxation of several development curbs such as the 
semi-agricultural zone development restriction. Such expansion of housing 
and regional development projects and relaxation of development restrictions 
provided abundant resources for the construction alliance to continue to 
grow. 
The scalar restructuring of the state (e.g. the implementation of a 
Regional Autonomy System in the 1990s) and intensification of regionalist 
politics, a result of democratization, allowed the construction alliance and 
developmental ideology to simultaneously grow and intensify. First, because 
of the implementation of a Regional Autonomy System, local government 
leaders, such as governors and mayors, came to be elected by local residents. 
This increased the role of the local government leaders as a representative 
for territorialized interests at the local scale. As a result, at the local scale 
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territorial development alliance formation became more active. Also, with 
the decentralization, as the local government’s budgetary independence 
and responsibility increased, each local government began trying to attract 
private capital for regional development projects through public-private 
partnerships, which in turn provided an opportunity to form development 
and construction alliances at the local scale. As a result, the profit motive 
in local development projects was elevated, while the principle of the 
public good was drastically diminished. The start of decentralization also 
intensified inter-regional competition over central government funding for 
local development. This induced local parliamentary members, who lived by 
promoting regional development issues within the regional political cleavage 
structure, to become more actively involved in local development projects. 
In the early 1990s, the neoliberal conversion began, but went into full force 
only after the 1997 Financial crisis. However, even though this neoliberal 
conversion was taking place, it did not mean that the economic regulatory 
system would change completely to an ideal-type of neoliberalism. It has 
been widely observed that the “actually existing neoliberalism” in reality 
appears as a hybrid form stemming from the path-dependent, contextually 
specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent 
neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects (Brenner and Theodore 
2002; Tickell and Peck 2003). South Korea adheres to this in that it follows 
‘developmental neoliberalism’ in instances where neoliberalism shows a 
strong “neo-statist” tendency, because of strong path-dependency of the 
developmental state regulatory framework. 
How does this mixed tendency emerge in regards to a state’s construction-
oriented tendency? First, if one looks at the path-dependency of the previously 
created construction-oriented developmentalism, it can find the following 
tendencies: 1) construction interest groups and their alliances—such as 
construction bureaucrats, the construction industry, local government, local 
legislative members, media, and intellectuals—at national and regional scales 
continue to have political influence; and 2) since the 1960s, as continuous 
construction-oriented development and the consequent acquisition of wealth 
through real estate investment became the main source of upward mobility, 
real estate was identified as the most lucrative area for speculation. As a 
result, construction-oriented discourses such as the Real Estate Invincibility 
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Legend and Real Estate Investment Supremacy became the predominant 
guiding ideologies for individuals hoping to get rich. Along with these path-
dependent tendencies from the past, as neoliberalism spreads, discourses 
such as competition, markets, and entrepreneurialism became predominant, 
while discourses about the public good were minimalized. The combination 
of these two conditions has facilitated the active intervention of the central 
and local governments in urban and regional development projects under the 
name of improving national or regional competitiveness, and brought about 
‘neo-developmentalism’, which promotes profit making and improvement in 
competitiveness as the goal of development rather than the public good. 
Such neo-developmentalism attracts extensive support from the various 
construction-related interest groups at national or regional scales, such as 
land owners, construction-related capital, construction-related bureaucrats, 
local governments, local legislative members and the media. Furthermore, 
because of its neoliberal and market-friendly goals such as competition and 
efficiency, neo-developmentalism receives extensive support from followers 
of neoliberalism. As a result, the South Korean state has become a “neoliberal 
construction-oriented state.” 
VII. coNcLUSIoN
This paper speculates on what kind of political, social, and economic 
processes created the South Korean state’s neo-developmental tendency. 
From the 1960s to the present, as a result of South Korean state’s spatial 
policies and complex political-economic processes surrounding them, the 
political mobilization of territorial interests at the local scale became very 
active. Hence, it is argued here that the state’s construction-oriented tendency 
has intensified. More specifically, this paper emphasizes: 1) as the central 
cleavage structure in party politics has been formed based on region, parties 
and politicians have easily complied with regional development politics and 
influenced governmental decision-making; 2) because of the immaturity 
of class politics and grass-root democratization, place-based interests at 
the local scale have been powerfully territorialized; and 3) because the 
effects of regionalist politics have continued since the 1970s, the discursive 
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framework interpreting the region’s political-economic reality has become 
very much politicized around “center-local” relations, greatly influencing the 
intensification of the South Korean state’s construction-oriented tendency. 
Because of the state-centric nature of the Korean social sciences, the 
political-economic processes at the local and regional scales have been rarely 
considered as the core of causal relations in explaining the Korean social 
phenomena. This has affected explanations on the construction-oriented 
development projects that have strong place-based and local characteristics. 
Therefore, in the existing studies on neo-developmentalism or construction-
oriented state theory, territorialized politics at the local or regional scales were 
regarded only as by-products or outcomes of national-scale development 
politics. However, this paper argues that territorial politics at the local or 
regional scales is one of the main factors explaining South Korean state’s 
construction-oriented tendency.
Based on this analysis, I argue that the efforts to resolve the problems 
arising from the Korean state’s neo-developmental policies and construction-
oriented tendency requires not only attacking the discourses of devel-
opmentalism and criticizing the national-scale construction alliances, but also 
weakening the development politics organized at the local or regional scales. 
Yet, as discussed briefly above, because the South Korean state’s construction-
oriented development tendency is a result of political, economic, social, and 
spatial conditions intricately intertwined with the process of South Korean 
capitalist development, it would seem difficult to resolve the situation simply 
by institutional reforms of regional development practices or decision making 
processes. The political-economic system, seemingly unrelated to government 
construction projects or development politics, first needs to be fundamentally 
changed in order to hinder further revitalization of developmentalist politics 
based on regional interests. To design such measures, deeper empirical studies 
about the operation of regional development politics and the processes by 
which regional interests influence the strategic selectivity of the Korean state 
are necessary. 
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